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U.S. SPEAKER
Ambassador Susan G. Essermant
Thank you, Dick.
It is a pleasure to be here for the first time at the Canada-U.S. Law Insti-
tute. I just want to say how impressed I am by the rich and diverse array of
programs that you put together, Henry.
I'd like to begin with a bit of a historical perspective to put in context The
United States-Canada relations and the U.S. perspective on free trade agree-
ments. I want to begin with the observation that the U.S. approach to free
trade agreements over the years, including today, has been heavily influenced
and shaped by our experience with the passage and the aftermath of the
NAFTA agreement.
It is fair to say that the NAFTA agreement was a watershed event in terms
of ours and even other countries' approaches to trade policy and free trade
agreements.' I'd like to begin with the U.S. side of the equation. NAFTA
I Ambassador Susan G. Esserman is a partner in the Washington office of Steptoe &
Johnson LLP, where she is chair of the firm's International Department. Prior to joining the
firm, Ms. Esserman held four senior-level positions with the Office of the US Trade Represen-
tative (USTR) and Commerce Department during the Clinton Administration. She was ap-
pointed by President Clinton and confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Deputy US Trade Represen-
tative, the second-ranking official at the USTR, with the standing of Ambassador. She was
responsible for US trade policy and negotiations with Europe, India, Russia and the former
Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East and in the WTO. She also held the position of USTR
General Counsel where she played a lead role in devising US litigation strategy in the critical
early years of WTO dispute resolution. Ms. Esserman also served as the decision maker in
literally hundreds of antidumping and countervailing duty cases as Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Import Administration. In addition, she played a lead role in developing com-
prehensive antidumping and countervailing duty trade legislation and regulations implement-
ing the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement. In that capacity, she was the administrator of the
Foreign Trade Zones program. As Acting General Counsel of Commerce, Ms. Esserman
counseled the Secretary of Commerce and senior Department heads on a wide range of issues,
including trade laws, regulatory reform, litigation strategy, ethics, Freedom of Information,
congressional reviews and oversight, intellectual property, and procurement issues. Prior to
her government service, Ms. Esserman was a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP where she
specialized in international trade litigation and policy.
1 See John Audley, Political Leverage and Access to Trade Monopolies, Asia Pacific
Policy Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, (forth-
coming 2005), http://www.ap.harvard.edu/mainsite/papers/tne/audley/audley.html.
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remains - in terms of the scope of the subjects covered - the most compre-
hensive free trade agreement that the U.S. has ever negotiated.2 In part in
response to the negative reaction arising from NAFTA, the U.S. Government
has scaled back the coverage in subsequent free trade agreements. All of you
can think of one of the most prominent examples: the Chapter 19 panel proc-
ess was never included in any subsequent free trade agreements,3 and there
are certainly other examples.
Second, as you recall, NAFTA - specifically the agreement with Mexico
- was the first trade agreement that we had negotiated with a developing
country with substantially lower wages and living standards than in the
United States.4 And there was huge concern at the time that an agreement
with a country with such different standards would very much adversely af-
fect certain industries, especially labor-intensive industries,5 and of course,
this concern was magnified because Mexico was on our border.6
Thus, there was intense concern among certain constituent groups that
these agreements would lead to a race to the bottom in terms of wages and
2 See Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means:
Hearing on the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Jeffrey J.
Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/1 05cong/7-22-97/7-22scho.htm.
3 See generally Duties And Dumping: What's Going Wrong With Chapter 19?, The Cana-
dian-American Bus. Council and the Center for Strategic and Int'l Studies, n. 29 (2004), (cit-
ing the following documents in this footnote as subsequent agreements that omit Chapter 19
provisions); see also, Statement on How the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Makes
Progress In Achieving U.S. Purposes, Policies, Objectives, and Priorities, House Ways and
Means Committee Report (2005), ("The FTA does not address antidumping or countervailing
duty issues."); see also J.F. Hornbeck, The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Economic and
Trade Policy Issues (2003), at CRS-I I (stating that Chile wants to address U.S. antidumping
laws in the free trade agreement), at CRS-16 ("In an unanticipated outcome, no chapter on
trade remedies was included [in the FTA], hence there would be no expected change to the
antidumping and countervailing duty options currently available to both countries.").
4 See Raymond J. Ahearn, US Department of State, Trade and the Americas, CRS Issue
Brief for Congress (2003), at CRS-1I ("It is the first free trade agreement that the United
States entered into with a lower-wage and lower-income developing country.").
5 See generally Mary E. Burfisher, Sherman Robinson & Karen Thierfelder, The Impact of
NAFTA on the United States, 15 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 124, 125 (Winter 2001) ("Oppo-
nents [to NAFTA] voiced a number of concerns, focusing on the impact of the agreement on
U.S. labor markets."); see also Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Reginald Jones, & Jeffrey J. Schott,
North American Labor Under NAFTA, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. (2002), at 17-18 (acknowledg-
ing Mexican child labor practices); see also Jeremy Brecher, NAFTA: Right or wrong? It
will send jobs across the border, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 27, 1993, at N15 (rebutting
widely-held concerns that "low-wage Mexican labor will victimize millions of high-paid
American workers.").
6 See Jobs And Pollution Are On The NAFTA Agonda, L.A. TIMES, March 16, 1993, at
[Vol. 31 ]
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living standards.7 As a result, the NAFTA agreement, both preceding and
following its passage, changed the dynamic in the United States on trade. It
brought greater public attention to trade in general and to the FTA discus-
sions in particular.
Second, this debate led to the participation of a broader range of interests
than had been involved previously in the trade negotiation process. Begin-
ning with NAFTA, and ever since, there have been environmental, labor,
human rights, and other stakeholders routinely participating in the free trade
agreement debate.
8
Third, both the increased public scrutiny as well as this broader array of
actors participating in the process forced a certain degree of transparency that
had never previously existed, and that changed the dynamic in the United
States. 9
And, of course, the differences in the living standards between Mexico
and the U.S. led to the need to address labor and environment to some degree
in every trade agreement since.' 0 But, more fundamentally, the NAFTA ex-
perience very much affected our thinking about the choice of the next logical
free trade agreement partner.
Finally, long memories and perceptions from the NAFTA debate often in-
fluence, I might say often irrationally, the responses, particularly of members
of Congress on current free trade agreements. House members today rou-
tinely claim that their opposition to CAFTA and other agreements stems
from the so-called "broken promises" from the NAFTA debate."
But now I want to turn to the foreign side, because we can see in retro-
spect that the NAFTA agreement served as a triggering event for other coun-
tries' thinking about free trade agreements. In other words, NAFTA
prompted other countries to launch and conclude their own free trade agree-
ments with non-U.S. partners.'
2
Following NAFTA, Europe, Canada, - and especially Mexico, moved
ahead relatively rapidly in pursuing free trade agreements, while the U.S.
7 See Steve Arnold, NAFTA for and against, HAMILTON STAR, Aug. 27, 1993, at T4 (ex-
pressing concerns that "NAFTA will be the start of a downward spiral.").
8 See Susan Ariel Aaronson, Can Corporations Safeguard Labor and Human Rights?,
YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, June 24, 2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4131.
9 Michael C. McClintock, Sunrise Mexico; Sunset NAFTA-Centric FTAA - What Next and
Why?, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 57 (2000).
10 Id. at 54-55; see also Joseph Kahn, Clinton Shift on Trade: 'Wake-Up Call,' N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at A6.
1 Jane Harman, False Claims for Free Trade, Again, DAILY BREEZE, March 29, 2005, at
A13.
12 See Guy Poitras, The Potential for US. Economic Dominance, 6 NAFrA: L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 389, at 393 (2000) (discussing U.S. power in the Americas); see also Alejandro Reuss,
The ABCs of "Free-Trade Agreements," DOLLARS AND SENSE, Feb. 28, 2001, at 24.
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was constrained to move due to the lack of political consensus on free trade
agreements, in part, arising from the political fallout from the NAFTA.
It may interest you to know that even during this fallow period in the 90s
when the U.S. did not have fast track authority, a number of countries around
the world continued to aggressively seek free trade agreements with the
United States. I don't think this fact is very well known because it was al-
ways thought that no one could ask if we had no fast track authority, but the
contrary is true.
There was disagreement in the Clinton Administration for a variety of
reasons about the wisdom of pursuing such agreements. Most interestingly,
certain free trade - indeed, the most ardent free trade -- advocates in the Ad-
ministration opposed pursuit of FTAs with such countries as Singapore, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand.
They opposed pursuit of these FTAs because they felt the benefits were
insubstantial because of the small size of the trading relationships. In 2000,
concerned about free trade agreement movement around the world and frus-
trated with the paralysis in the WTO, the Clinton Administration did move
ahead with the Jordan Free Trade Agreement 13 and launched negotiations
that would ultimately lead to the Chile and Singapore agreements.
14
But as everybody knows, there is no question that during the Bush Ad-
ministration, the emphasis has been very different, and free trade agreements
have been the vehicle of choice to promote a trade liberalization agenda.15
The approach, founded on the competitive liberalization theory advanced
by Ambassador Zoellick, is based on the belief that aggressive pursuit of
bilateral free trade agreements will spur competition among countries to lib-
eralize trade at the bilateral and regional level, and most importantly, in
WTO agreements.16 1 think the jury is out on that point in terms of whether or
not aggressive FTA pursuit really does and has led to more rapid movement
in the WTO.
13 Karissa Taylor Kovner et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2000 Public
International Law, 35 INT'L LAW. 659, 699 (2001).
14 See Gillian Tett, Asian Ambition: Frustration with Deadlock at the World Trade Or-
ganisation and a Fear of Becoming Isolated have Prompted Pacific Rim Nations to Seek Secu-
rity in Regional Free Trade, says Guy de Jonquieres, FIN. TIMES U.K., November 28, 2000, at
24.
15 APEC, U.S. Committed to Advancing Doha Trade Talks, USTR Says, DEP'T ST. DOC.,
Nov. 19, 1989.
16 See Outcome of Summit of the Americas and Prospects for Free Trade in the Hemi-
sphere: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107 t"
Cong. (2001) (statement of Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, Office of
the United States Trade Representative); see also U.S. Trade Rep. Office, The President's
Trade Policy Agenda (2005), (referencing competitive liberalization theory).
[Vol. 3 1 ]
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But this whole rationale was seen to have much greater force in 2003, fol-
lowing the difficulties that everybody experienced in the WTO Cancun meet-
ing in September 2003. You will recall that Ambassador Zoellick was very,
very explicit about the use of free trade agreements following the collapse in
the WTO negotiations. He indicated he would consider the cooperative ap-
proaches of countries in the WTO in selecting free trade partners and in or-
dering his priorities.'
7
No question that the Bush Administration accelerated free trade agree-
ment negotiations. This agenda was seen as an important way to make up for
ground lost during the period of time in which the U.S. was constrained to
move forward due to the lack of fast track or trade promotion authority.
And finally, the U.S. sees itself as having greater leverage in bilateral free
trade agreements to secure its interests. It is believed that the provisions that
are negotiated, particularly in some of the newer agreement areas, like serv-
ices, can serve as models for the WTO negotiations. So that is the rationale
for what is going on today.
There are two overriding factors that affect both the choice of free trade
partners in the United States as well as the content and the level of ambition
of the free trade agreements that are negotiated; first, the need to secure a
majority vote in the House of Representatives, where the trade votes are so
difficult. This influences the available choices for free trade agreements.
I think people sometimes forget this and think that once we have secured
fast track, that the political issues on FTA are muted. But with or without fast
track, the need to secure 218 votes is the overriding determinant, which
makes the U.S. different than other countries with parliamentary systems or
self-implementing agreements.
This, in turn, has led the United States to select countries as FTA partners
with relatively small volumes of trade, but whose trade with the U.S. poses
minimal threats to key domestic constituencies. 18
Countries that offer much more attractive export markets for the U.S. are
generally off the table because these countries are highly competitive in sec-
tors such as agriculture and textiles that are seen as politically sensitive in the
United States. 19 And, of course, this is especially the case when the country
has a substantially lower level of development than the United States.
17 See generally E. Anthony Wayne, Remarks to the Leadership Forum Dinner, Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations on U.S. Trade Policy After Cancun (Sept. 15, 2003), available
at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2003/24170.htm (summarizing U.S. trade strategy to pur-
sue trade agreements with countries committed to open markets and undertaking economic
reform).
18 The Pros and Cons of Pursuing Free-Trade Agreements, Congressional Budget Office, 7
(2003).
19 See generally Robert Portman and Mike Johanns, Press Conference at the United States
Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 11, 2005) available at
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But no question, the need to get the majority vote has affected the level of
ambition and the comprehensiveness of the free trade agreement. I think the
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 2° and the decision to exclude sugar
from the agreement is a great example of that.
The second overriding factor today is the greater role of foreign policy
and security interests in the free trade agreement process. There is no ques-
tion that foreign policy objectives have long been rationales for U.S. trade
policy initiatives generally and, more specifically, for decisions to enter into
FTAs. 2'
Certainly, foreign policy objectives were very key in our selection early
on of Israel as a free trade partner in 1985. The Jordan FTA in 2000 was very
clearly motivated by the desire to offer King Abdullah a dividend for his
efforts in promoting peace and to serve as an incentive to other governments
who were cooperative in the peace arena in the Middle East.
It was also clear that due in part to King Abdullah's and Jordan's savvy in
dealing with Congress, that the requisite majority in the House could be gar-
nered in support of the Jordan FTA.
But getting back to the main point, the foreign policy imperative post 9/11
has become a much more influential factor in the ordering and priority of free
trade agreements.
Especially since 9/11, the Administration has sought out partners in the
Middle East with the view that opportunities created by trade can help coun-
tries turn away from radical ideologies that often stem from lack of economic
opportunity.
Also, a free trade agreement can reward allies who either support our for-
eign policy, cooperate with the U.S., or who serve as models for moderation
in volatile regions of the world.22 Hence, the explanation for the choice of the
Middle East countries of Morocco and Bahrain as free trade partners - not
countries with which we have much trade.23
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/s.7 0 A/7 0 1 OB?contentidonly--true&contentid=200
5/10/0437.xml (discussing prospective United States trade strategy regarding textiles and
agriculture).
20 Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 1 (2004),
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/FinalText/asset uplo
ad file 148_5168.pdf.
21 See generally Sidney Weintraub, The politics of US trade policy, BBC NEWS WORLD
EDITION, Sept. 3, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3169649.stm (recog-
nizing United States foreign policy as a controlling factor in its initiation of trade agreements).
22 Daniel T. Griswold, Free-Trade Agreements: Steppingstones to a More Open World,
Center for Trade Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, 2, (2003).
23 Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Bahrain Sign
Free Trade Agreement (Sept. 14, 2004) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Press Releases/2004/September/UnitedStatesBahra
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But, of course, even our foreign policy objectives are tempered by politi-
cal feasibility and the need to secure the majority vote in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Absent this constraint, it might have been expected and logical
that Egypt, with its significant influence in the Middle East and the impact of
reform in the country, would have been the logical free trade partner for us.
Today the free trade debate is being played out in the U.S. effort to seek
passage of the CAFTA. The outcome of the CAFTA debate will be a bell-
wether for other trade agreements on the horizon. This is especially the case
with the Andean nations agreements that are being negotiated.
In this debate, we see the divisions and sensitivities that arose out of
NAFTA repeated over and over again. First, the differences between the Re-
publicans and the Democrats on labor and environment issues are intensified
in this debate. Many of the Democrats believe that a binding commitment
stronger than simply requiring countries to enforce existing laws is abso-
lutely essential in the text of the CAFTA because of the relatively lower la-
bor and environmental standards in the CAFTA countries,24 compared with
Chile and Singapore, with whom we have recently negotiated free trade
agreements.25
Concerns persist about the threat to sovereign environmental and health
safety regulations presented by the investor state provisions - again, an issue
arising out of the NAFTA. 26 Opposition from import sensitive sectors, espe-
cially sugar, remain a problem,27 and the Administration's approaches in this
area could well determine the fate of the CAFTA agreement in the Con-
28gress.
We also see "newer issues" that have flared up in the more recent free
trade agreements, most prominently the U.S. efforts to ensure data exclusiv-
ity in the patent area that have pitted certain NGOs and local country inter-
ests against U.S. pharmaceutical concerns.29
in SignFree Trade Agreement.html.
See Karen MacPherson, House Narrowly OKs Trade Agreement, THE TOLEDO BLADE,
Jul. 28, 2005 (stating "[a]n overwhelming majority of House Democrats said CAFTA fails to
provide important labor and environmental standards in Central American countries").
25 Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, CAFTA Facts: Free Trade Agreements Are Work-
ing For America 1-2 (2005).
26 Daphne Eviatar, A Toxic Trade-Off, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at B01.
27 See Thomas B. Edsall, CAFTA in Peril on Capitol Hill: One Business Leader Gives
Lawmakers an Ultimatum, WASH. POST, June 12, 2005, at A06 (stating that opponents to
CAFTA include organized labor, the sugar industry, and most Democrats).
28 /d.
29 See Encarna Nunez-Diaz, Government of Guatemala Introduces New Data Exclusivity
Regulation, WORLD MARKETS RESEARCH CENTER, Mar. 23, 2005 (stating that as a result of
pressure from the U.S. government, Guatemala passed new regulations providing a minimum
of five years of data exclusivity for pharmaceutical companies, beyond the 20 years of pat-
ent protection established by WTO intellectual property (IP) agreements)."
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But going back to my initial point, you continually hear, as I said earlier,
CAFTA opponents talk about the "broken promises" from NAFTA. So
CAFTA certainly has a very tough road ahead, and - what happens will be a
bellwether for future agreements in the United States.
I should say that as many of you here, who have been participating in free
trade agreement debates know, you hear today so much of the same concerns
coming out of the Congress. There was a hearing on CAFTA the other day,
and of course, Senator Max Baucus, the ranking Senate Finance Committee
Democrat, was saying, "Where is the Administration? You know, they really
need to put their capital in this."30 These are actually very typical refrains in
the prelude to the vote.
So I don't really judge very much from some of the dialogue that is going
back and forth now in terms of assessing whether CAFTA is going to pass. I
think it is going to be close, but I think some of the dire predictions are not
necessarily on the mark.
Let me just turn very briefly to some current issues and attitudes about
NAFTA.
I think, looking back on it, that the most remarkable effect of NAFTA is
the extent and degree of integration that we see between our countries - with
companies and industries making decisions on investment and trade from an
integrated NAFTA perspective. Indeed, a very substantial proportion of trade
among the NAFTA countries is intra-firm or intra-industry in nature.
So from an economic standpoint, notwithstanding the many criticisms of
NAFTA, there has to be an acknowledgement of this success. But, of course,
having said that, there remain some very significant challenges that we must
confront. I have seen recommendations for radical changes in the NAFTA
relationships, such as a customs union, and suggestions of that sort. Frankly
those are not realistic, and thus it is not worth investing a lot of capital in
those sorts of proposals at this juncture.
I think the biggest challenge given 9/11 and the heightened security issues
on our long common borders is finding a way to ensure that we promote se-
curity without rolling back the remarkable benefits of integration coming
from the NAFTA.
No question the U.S. Government today sees its northern and southern
borders as points of vulnerability for future attack. 3 1 9/11, the Canadian ori-
gins of the foiled millennium bombing plot, the perception of lax immigra-
tion laws in both Canada and Mexico, and the recognition by U.S. officials of
30 Max Baucus, Senator, Committee on Senate Finance, Congressional Testimony: US.-
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade (Apr. 13, 2005).
31 See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334,
18 Stat. 1321 (appropriating $4.5 billion for Customs and Border Protection for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2005).
[Vol. 31 ]
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their own insufficient infrastructure and technology at border check points
have worked to elevate security as a preeminent concern in the management
of the U.S.-Canada relationship.32
As the U.S. Ambassador to Canada recently put it, "security trumps trade
while we must keep trade flowing." 33 And that's the key. Some of the bilat-
eral initiatives on this score have been helpful and have sought to strike a
balance, such as the smart border initiative that has established mechanisms
and institutionalized contact for officials on both sides of the border.34 To
collaborate on these issues I think are the ways in which we should go rather
than trying to deal with these problems on an ad hoc basis.
It is hard to really understand the significance and real impact coming
from the security and prosperity partnership North America announced re-
cently.35 But one thing was welcome, which is the apparent recognition of the
primacy of security and economic competitiveness and growth.
And I think that there was an effort to focus on specific means to promote
efficiency and NAFTA transportation, energy, and other sectors. If this were
truly implemented, it could enhance NAFTA's competitiveness, particularly
in the face of the onslaught of Asian imports.
And frankly, I always thought that we ought to be looking more at
NAFTA from that perspective, that is, specifically as to how we can develop
policy, adopt measures, and deepen our integration in a way to enhance the
competitiveness of industries in our three countries so that we are stronger in
dealing with Asian competitors.
Let me briefly mention one other irritant that needs to be addressed, al-
though here again I don't think we should be overly ambitious: addressing,
32 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of Canada for Cooperation in Science and Technology for Critical Infrastructure
Protection and Border Security, U.S.-Can., June 1, 2004, available at
http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/canusa/bordersecurity_60 104.pdf.
33 American Assembly Final Report, 60 INT'L J. 516 (2005) (citing Former Ambassador
Paul Cellucci's comment at the 105th American Assembly at Arden House in Harriman, NY,
February 3-6, 2005).
34 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Canada Smart Border/30 Point
Action Plan Update (Dec. 6, 2002); see also The Smart Border Declaration: Building A Smart
Border for the 21st Century on the Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, U.S.-
Can., Dec. 12, 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/declaration-
en.asp.
35 Joint Press Conference with President Vicente Fox of Mexico, President George W.
Bush of the United States and Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada (March 23, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/buscador/?contenido=17360; see also Press Release,
Office of the Prime Minister, Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America Estab-
lished (March 23, 2005), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=443; Press Release,
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Security and Prosperity Partnership of North Amer-
ica (March 23, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-4.html.
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the other major point of contention in our relationship is the dissatisfaction
and concern arising from dispute settlement, particularly Chapter 19 and
Chapter 11.
The ongoing saga with softwood lumber certainly has raised questions in
Canada as to whether or not the NAFTA partners enjoy less rights in chal-
lenging U.S. antidumping and countervailing determinations under Chapter
19, 6 than non-NAFTA countries pursuing these challenges through the
courts.
The delays in assembling panels are unacceptable, and there have been
concems in certain quarters in North America that the extraordinary chal-
lenge device has been used to launch personal attacks on panelists, which in
turn, makes it difficult to develop a reliable roster list.
We are not going to have grand scale reform of Chapter 19, so we ought
to address the problems that responsible governments can fix. To me, it is
irresponsible that the U.S. Government and the Canadian Government have
not focused on dealing with the naming of the panelists. Surely we can work
to do that.
We should fund the NAFTA Secretariat. We should shore up the list of
panelists. I have always thought - I know many disagree with this - but I
always thought retired judges and retired practitioners who don't have con-
flicts should be on the roster of NAFTA. We ought to be drawing more
broadly from those groups because either they have expertise in the relevant
areas or they have expertise in judging. It's very important to a fair result in
the panel process. We really need to address this aspect and avoid some of
the other bigger issues that are impossible to deal with.
Chapter 11, which we can discuss if people are interested, is another area
that is an irritant. You see it arise again in the CAFTA dispute today.37
But let me conclude by saying that I think we ought to try to deepen the
integration to strengthen NAFTA, to strengthen our competitiveness vis-A-vis
other trading partners both in terms of developing policy and also trilateral
responses where we can be effective in the WTO or where we can be effec-
36 See generally, Export and Import Controls Bureau, Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber
Trade Relations (1982-2004), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/chrono-en.asp (last
visited Oct. 16, 2005); see also Softwood Lumber from Canada Investigations Nos. 701-TA-
414 and 73 1-TA-928 (Final) Determinations and Views of the Commission, U.S. International
Trade Commission Publication No. 3509, (2002),
http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/701_731/pub3509.pdf (instituting tariffs on Canadian soft-
wood lumber in May 2002).
37 See David Armstrong, CAFTA Friends, Foes State Their Case on Free Trade Deal;
Central America Pact Goes to House After OK by Senate, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 3,
2005; see also Press Release, Rep. Jane Harman (CA), Rep Harman Announces Opposition
Central American Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 29, 2005); Press Release, Rep. Ted Strickland
(OH), Rep. Stickland Votes Against CAFTA (July 28, 2005).
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tive in dealing with some of the competition that the countries together face
in North America.
But I don't see the scope for some of the dramatic reform proposals that
have recently come out of the U.S.-Canada groups calling for customs unions
and dramatic reform of Chapter 19. I think those are just not in the cards.
In the United States, trade is not even the top priority.38 As many of you
know, there is a huge focus on major domestic reform initiatives, such as
Social Security,3 9 and it becomes difficult for the Administration even to give
the proper attention to CAFTA and other trade issues. And then when you
get to the trade issues, certainly reform of NAFTA or a major extension of
NAFTA will not be the top of the trade agenda in the United States.
So we should be modest but determined in our goals because I think some
of the concrete improvements can make a difference.
Thank you.
MR. CUNNINGHAM: Thank you, Ambassador Esserman.
Before turning the podium over to Simon Potter, I would just say to all of
you in the audience, if you take nothing else away from Ambassador Esser-
man's remarks, the emphasis on the primacy of Congress in this area of trade
policy is something you must underline.
Those of you who have been wondering about why we now have the U.S.
trade representative that we have, a man who is not - has never negotiated a
trade agreement, a man who has not been a trade practitioner or academic, a
man who has not had diplomatic experience but a man who is influential and
well liked in the House of Congress, that should tell you why this Admini-
stration sees him as playing a major role as U.S. trade representative in this
next four years, the necessity of getting through Congress things which for
the reasons that Ambassador Esserman stated are going to be actually quite
difficult to get through Congress, that's why we have Rob Portman in that
chair.
Simon, let me turn it over to you now.
38 In recent years, President Bush has emphasized as critical priorities, among others, na-
tional security (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/l0/20031009-9.htrnl), the
military (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020123-13.html), the energy
bill (http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/economy/excerpts-novl2.html), and saving lives
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050831-3.html).
3 See generally Strengthening Social Security, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-
security/; The Future of Social Security, SSA Publication No. 05-10055 (March 2005), avail-
able at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10055.pdf.
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